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Abstract 
This paper examines how foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) have grown in Vietnam’s 
manufacturing and trade industries, and tries to shed light on how MNE takeovers of 
Vietnamese firms have affected employment, and wages between 2000 and 2012. Although 
the scale of MNE activity has been substantial and grown in recent years, there are substantial 
discrepancies in measures of MNE shares from alternative sources and uncertainty over the 
actual share of MNEs in Vietnamese production or employment. On the other hand, the 
number of MNE takeovers has been very small and they appear to have played only a small 
role in changes of MNE shares. Rather, changes in MNE shares have resulted primarily from 
the entry and exit MNEs and changes in the scale of MNE activity. 
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1. Introduction 
Many previous studies and compilations of official statistics have documented the rapid 
growth of foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) in Vietnam after the substantial reforms 
(Doi Moi) that began in 1986 and stabilization of the economy in the mid-1990s. After firm-
level data from Vietnam’s relatively comprehensive, annual enterprise surveys for 2000 
forward became available, studies of MNEs and how they compared to or affected local firms  
performance also became numerous. For example, Athukorala and Tien (2012) and 
Ramstetter and Phan (2013) provide evidence that MNEs, especially exporting MNEs, tend to 
have relatively high productivity compared to local firms, but evidence was relatively weak in 
several industry groups. The latter study suggests that productivity spillovers from MNEs to 
local firms are generally weak, while Le and Pomfret (2011) indicate that only vertical 
spillovers are significant and Truong et al (2015) provide evidence that spillovers were 
relatively large in industries with low effective rates of protection and low shares of wholly 
foreign MNEs. Evidence on wage effects is somewhat stronger, suggesting that MNEs tend to 
pay relatively high wages even after accounting for numerous other differences in firm 
characteristics as well as worker education and occupation (Nguyen 2015, Nguyen and 
Ramstetter 2015a). However, there is also evidence that MNE-local wage differentials were 
largest for a relatively few number of highly skilled workers (Nguyen and Ramstetter 2015b).  
Another set of interesting questions can be asked about how MNE takeovers affect target 
firms. Because MNE shares of firm turnover and employment have grown rapidly for most of 
the last two decades, we assumed that MNE takeovers had been relatively common, as they 
were in Indonesia after the large trade reforms of 1986 and in China after the run up to its 
WTO accession in 2001. Substantial policy changes in Vietnam reinforced this perception 
because the promulgation of the Enterprise Law in late 2000 and its subsequent 
implementation (Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003), reforms related to the implementation of the 
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Bilateral Trade Agreement between Vietnam and the United States in 2001 and the 
implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement in 2005, and further reforms related to 
Vietnam’s own WTO accession in late 2006 all reduced previous biases against private 
ownership. Correspondingly, we thought that analyzing how MNE takeovers affect wages or 
employment in target would facilitate better understanding Vietnam’s economy.  
However, as we will document below, takeovers by MNEs appear to have been extremely 
rare during 2000-2012 in Vietnam. Not surprisingly, there were even fewer takeovers by 
state-owned enterprises, but somewhat more numerous takeovers by private firms. Another 
puzzle that emerges from comparison of the enterprise data and economy-wide estimates of 
GDP or employment surrounds the extent to which MNE shares have been growing and SOE 
or state shares have been falling, particularly the latter. Thus, after a brief review of the 
literature on the effects of MNE takeovers (Section 2), we first compare alternative estimates 
of MNE and SOE shares of Vietnam’s economy and trends in those shares (Section 3). We 
then examine the data we have been able to compile on takeovers (Section 4) and offer some 
concluding remarks, focusing on the future research agenda (Section 5). 
 
2. Literature Review  
Theory and empirical evidence suggest MNEs are likely to possess relatively large amounts 
of generally knowledge-based, intangible, firm-specific assets related to production 
technology, marketing, and entrepreneurship that should make these firms more productive 
than non-MNEs (Buckley and Casson 1992; Casson 1987; Caves 2007; Dunning 1993; 
Rugman 1980, 1985). This is reflected by larger firm size, higher factor productivity and 
factor returns, and/or higher capital or technology intensity. If labor productivity is higher in 
MNEs than in non-MNEs as often assumed, wages should also be higher, and MNE takeovers 
should also lead to higher wages. On the other hand, the effects of MNE ownership on 
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employment levels or changes in employment are ambiguous. 
In contrast, economists since Adam Smith have long assumed that SOEs will tend to be 
more inefficient than private firms because SOE managers have weaker incentives to 
minimize costs than managers of private firms. If this inefficiency leads to low labor 
productivity, then SOEs are likely to pay relatively low wages. In contrast, previous empirical 
evidence suggests that SOEs often pay relatively high wages and have relatively high 
productivity, both in Vietnam (Ramstetter and Phan 2007, 2013; Nguyen 2015; Nguyen and 
Ramstetter 2015a, 2015b) and elsewhere (Brown et al., 2004, 2005; Djankov and Murrell 
2002; Megginson, and Netter 2001). Governments often choose to establish SOEs in 
relatively high productivity, high wage industries such as steel, this is an important reason that 
SOEs may have appear to have relatively high productivity or wages in samples covering 
several different industries. However, even within the steel industry, firm-level evidence 
suggests that SOEs or former SOEs were among the most efficient producers in China, Korea 
and Taiwan, for example (Ramstetter and Movshuk 2005).  
Previous research on manufacturing firms in Vietnam (Nguyen 2015; Nguyen and 
Ramstetter 2015a, 2015b) and manufacturing plants in Indonesia (Lipsey and Sjöholm 2004a; 
Ramstetter and Narjoko 2013) and Malaysia (Ramstetter 2014) have provided strong evidence 
that multinational enterprises (MNEs) tend to pay relatively high wages, even after the 
educational background of workers, worker occupation, and other firm- or plant-level 
characteristics are controlled for. These studies also provide evidence that and MNE-local or 
MNE-private wage differentials were relatively large for high-wage, white-collar (non-
production) workers in Indonesia and Vietnam. Hale and Long (2011) also found a similar 
pattern for a small sample of Chinese firms, but that foreign ownership had no effect on 
wages of relatively low-wage, ordinary workers.  
Studies of Indonesian manufacturing plants Lipsey and Sjöholm (2002), Sjöholm and 
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Lipsey (2006), Lipsey et al. (2010) and a recent study of Chinese manufacturing firms by 
Wang and Wang (2015) are the only ones known to examine how changes in ownership 
affected wages and/or employment at the firm or plant level in developing economies. 
Descriptive statistics for Indonesian plants in 1975-1999 (Lipsey and Sjöholm 2002; Sjöholm 
and Lipsey 2006), first suggest that MNE takeovers tended to lead to higher wages or 
unchanged after private, manufacturing plants were taken over, but that MNEs did not target 
high-wage plants for takeover. Blue collar employment also tended to increase after takeover, 
but white collar employment generally declined.  
On the other hand, fixed effects (FE) regressions suggested that MNE takeovers led to 
statistically significant increases in both wages and employment for both blue and white collar 
workers after accounting for plant characteristics such as size, input intensity, and energy 
intensity (Lipsey and Sjöholm 2002; Sjöholm and Lipsey 2006). Wage increases were larger 
for white collar workers but employment increases were larger for blue collar workers. Both 
takeover effects were relatively large after the drastic liberalization of Indonesian trade policy 
in 1985-1986 and varied substantially among specific industry groups. Propensity score 
matching (PSM) estimates also indicate that MNE takeovers led to employment growth, but 
small sample size made it impossible to examine differences among industries using this 
technique and PSM estimates of wage effects are not available (Lipsey et al. 2010).  
Wang and Wang’s (2015) study of Chinese manufacturing firms focuses more narrowly on 
PSM estimates comparing the effects of MNE takeovers with the effects of domestic 
takeovers in an attempt to “investigate the purified effect of foreign ownership” (p. 325). In 
contrast to our data on Vietnam, their data suggest there were a relatively very large number 
of MNE takeovers (an average of over 500 per year in 2000-2007, p. 329) and a much larger 
number of domestic takeovers of other domestic firms (an average of 3,834 per year). Their 
analyses suggest that MNE takeovers led to larger increases in output, employment, and 
5 
 
wages in target firms than did comparable domestic takeovers, but revealed no evidence of 
corresponding productivity improvements. Somewhat similarly, evidence that productivity is 
higher in manufacturing MNEs than in Vietnam’s local firms (Ramstetter and Phan 2013) is 
substantially weaker than the aforementioned evidence than correspondingly evidence that  
MNEs tend to pay relatively high wages in Vietnam, especially when estimates are performed 
at the industry level. 
 
3. MNE and SOE or State Shares of Vietnam’s Economy 
Ramstetter and Phan (2013, pp. 31-32) previously pointed out discrepancies between levels 
and patterns of MNE and SOE shares of firm sales (=turnover) and corresponding MNE or 
“State” shares of non-household GDP in 2000-2008. There are of course several important 
reasons for such discrepancies to exist. First, the sales variable includes intermediate 
consumption, while GDP excludes it. MNEs in particular are often observed to have relatively 
low ratios of value added to sales, especially in key processing industries like electronics and 
footwear, which suggests that MNE shares of sales might exceed corresponding shares of 
value added or GDP. Second, definitions of ownership groups may differ among data sets and 
sources, especially when joint ventures are involved. Third, sampling and compilation 
methodologies differ greatly. Fourth, the state share of GDP is likely to be larger than the 
SOE share of firm production because the state sector includes the government and other 
state-controlled organizations that produce goods and services, not just SOEs. 
Compilations of firm sales are relatively straightforward. If one believes firms report sales 
accurately can simply sum the amounts reported by firms on survey questionnaires. 
Alternatively, if one believes specific groups of firms tend to underreport sales (because, for 
example, they fear that accurate reporting could result in tax difficulties), one can adjust sales 
figures for those firms. Even when firms fail to report sales, it is often possible to estimate 
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missing values using information on other aspects of firm performance or firm performance in 
other years. One would also like to make similar calculations of firm-level value added but 
unfortunately Vietnam does not collect firm-level information on intermediate costs necessary 
to calculate value added.1 Compilation of firm-level information is also time-consuming, 
which means that definitive firm-level data are not usually available until two years after the 
year they refer to, and Vietnam’s enterprise survey compilations are available more quickly 
than similar compilations for most other economies.  
GDP, on the other hand, must be estimated much more rapidly, often on the basis of 
relatively incomplete information. This is why preliminary GDP estimates and revised GDP 
estimates often differ greatly for most economies in the world, and there are often several 
rounds of revisions. In contrast, there are usually relatively small differences between 
preliminary and revised estimates of GDP for Vietnam. There is also a large difference in 
coverage, because GDP estimates must cover the entire economy, including all firms, 
households, and other public and private organizations. On the other hand, the enterprise 
surveys explicitly exclude organizations other than firms and household firms, and collect 
limited information from most small firms with 10 or fewer employees (Jammal et al, 2006).2  
Despite all of these differences, estimates of MNE and SOE shares of non-household GDP 
and corresponding shares of firm sales were remarkably similar in 2000 (57 vs. 56 percent for 
SOEs and 20 percent each for MNEs, Table 1). MNE shares of both measures remained 
similar at 19-22 percent through 2005. However, from 2006 they diverged with MNE shares 
of GDP rising to 25 percent in 2007-2009 and then to 30 percent or more in 2013-2014. In 
                                                 
1 The General Statistics Office does, however, provide estimates of value added for major products of firms. 
These estimates are calculated from product-level sales data and industry-level (5-digit level of revision 4 
of the Vietnam Standard Industry Classification [VSIC] for recent years and 4-digit level of revision 3 for 
previous years) input-output coefficients. Presumably, these input-output are the same as those used to 
calculate GDP estimates. 
2 Casual inspection of the firm-level data also indicates that most firms reporting unrealistic or highly 
unusual data are small firms. This is not at all uncommon because the statistical agencies usually find it 
much easier to identify and correct obvious mistakes in data for large firms.  
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contrast, MNE shares of firm sales fell to 18 percent in 2008-2009 before rebounding to 20-22 
percent in 2011-2012 and 25 percent in 2013. The reasons for the divergence after 2006 are 
not clear.  
State shares of GDP and SOE shares of firm sales fell in most years, but state shares of 
GDP declined very little, while SOE shares of firm sales began to decline rapidly as early as 
2003 (Table 1). By 2004 the discrepancy in the two shares was over 10 percentage points (56 
versus 45 percent), and the discrepancy continued to widen, reaching 20 percent points or 
more in 2010 (53 versus 33 percent) and 2013 (50 versus 28 percent). The widening 
divergence suggests that production by the government and other state-controlled 
organizations has grown especially rapidly after the mid-2000s. It is difficult to understand 
precisely which government or other state entities have been growing so quickly and reached 
such a large scale. 
Because the GDP data indicate that state and MNE shares were relatively large, MNE 
shares grew relatively quickly, and state shares fell relatively slowly, they also imply that the 
share of private firms and other private entities was relatively small and declined in recent 
years, from 22-24 percent in 2000-2009 to 20-21 percent in 2010-2014 (Table 1). In marked 
contrast, private shares of firm sales increased markedly from 24 to 47 percent in 2000-2007, 
before stabilizing at 47-49 percent in 2008-2013. Here again, the reasons for the large 
discrepancies in trends over time are particularly difficult to understand. 
The major possible definitional difference between these two sources involves the 
classification of MNE joint ventures (JVs) with SOEs. Enterprise surveys suggest this group 
was relatively large in earlier years, accounting for 12-13 percent of firm sales in 2000-2001 
and 11 percent in 2002-2005 (Table 1). However the share of MNE JVs subsequently 
declined to 5-6 percent in 2009-2013. To the extent that the national accounts definition of the 
state includes these MNE-SOE JVs (which is not clear from public information), while the 
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enterprise survey definition is known to exclude them, this divergence can explain a small 
part of the discrepancies in recent years. On the other hand, if MNE-SOE JVs are reclassified 
as SOEs in the enterprise data, the discrepancy between alternative estimates of MNE shares 
widens. Moreover, reclassification cannot explain the growing discrepancies in state/SOE or 
MNE shares over time.  
Comparisons of non-household employment estimates from the Labor Force Surveys (LFS) 
and enterprise employment also suggest that state shares of non-household employment 
reported in the LFS (56 percent in 2007, 45-47 percent in 2009-2013) were much larger than 
corresponding SOE shares of enterprise employment (26-30 percent in 2007-2009 and 18-22 
percent in 2010-2014, Table 2). Here again, this presumably results primarily because the 
LFS estimates of state employment (4.8-5.5 million in 2007 and 2009-2013) include 
numerous state sector workers that didn’t work for SOEs (2.1-2.2 million workers according 
the enterprise surveys). However, it is difficult to understand why the discrepancy between 
the two estimates was so much smaller in 2009-2010 (2.5 million workers) than in other years 
(2.9-3.0 million in 2007 and 2011, 3.2-3.3 million in 2012-2013). Smaller discrepancies in 
2009-2010 are also counterintuitive because they suggest that the government and other non-
SOE, state entities reduced employment substantially just after the World Financial Crisis. 
In marked contrast to patterns observed for SOEs or MNE production, LFS estimated of 
foreign firm employment were substantially smaller than enterprise survey estimates after 
2009 (Table 2). Moreover, enterprise survey estimates for wholly-foreign MNEs were larger 
than LFS estimates for all foreign firms, especially in 2011-2013 when the discrepancy 
reached 35-56 percent if the LFS estimate. SOE shares of non-household employment (56 
percent in 2007, 44-47 percent in 2009-2014) were thus much larger than corresponding 
shares of firm employment (30 percent in 2007 and 18-26 percent in 2009-2013). On the other 
hand, MNE shares of non-household employment (11 and 14-17 percent, respectively) were 
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much smaller than MNE shares of firm employment (22-26 percent in 2007 and 2009-2013). 
Both the GDP data and LFS estimates of economy-wide employment suggest a much smaller 
role for private firms that the enterprise survey estimates. 
It is also important to note that SOE and MNE shares of non-household GDP or firm sales 
tended to exceed corresponding shares of non-household employment for MNEs and SOEs, 
and that the gap between these shares was relatively large for MNEs. This would suggest that 
MNEs had the highest GDP per employee followed by SOEs and that both groups had higher 
GDP per employee than the economy-wide average. On the other hand, GDP per employee 
was relatively low in the private sector. However, if the same comparison is made using the 
enterprise data, shares of sales were larger than shares of employment for SOEs, but not for 
MNEs or private firms. In other words, sales per employee were relatively large for SOEs 
compared to the overall average, but this was not true for MNEs or private firms.3 
The most important, reasonable conclusion one can make from careful examination of 
Tables 1 and 2 is that there are large discrepancies between GDP and LFS estimates of state 
and MNE shares and corresponding estimates of SOE and MNE shares from the enterprise 
surveys, especially in recent years. The largest source of these discrepancies is probably the 
fact that the state employs many workers and has substantial production outside of SOEs. 
However, the precise magnitude and institutions involved in this activity is unclear. Moreover, 
there are important discrepancies in measures of MNE production and employment that are 
much more difficult to explain, except by measurement error. Correspondingly, one needs to 
interpret the trends and levels of SOE and MNE shares observed in these data with caution, 
recognizing that substantial measurement errors that probably affect all estimates.  
 
                                                 
3 See Ramstetter and Phan (2013, Table 2 for more detailed comparisons of productivity in manufacturing 
industries; these comparisons suggest that MNEs generally had relatively high productivity once factor 
intensity and scale effects are accounted for and a lagged specification is used to partially account for 
simultaneity problems.  
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4. Changes in Firm Ownership, Employment, and Wages 
As documented in the previous section, Vietnam experienced rapid changes in ownership 
patterns and related changes in production and employment structures in recent years. Perhaps 
the most important change has been the relatively rapid growth of the formal enterprise sector 
relative to the whole economy. For example, according to the LFS data underlying Table 2, 
the share of non-household employment in total employment increased from 20 percent in 
2007 to 23 percent in 2014. If the enterprise data are used to calculate the ratio of firm 
employment to the total, this change appears to be even more rapid, the ratio rising from 16 
percent in 2007 to 22 percent in 2011-2013. Thus, although Vietnam remains a relatively poor 
developing economy where households (and individual proprietorships) still account for the 
vast majority of employment, the formal, corporate sector has been growing relatively rapidly.  
Among enterprises, MNEs have been growing relatively rapidly, while SOEs have been 
growing relatively slowly. Changes in the relative shares of MNEs and SOEs have three 
distinct causes, (1) the entry of new firms or exit of old ones, (2) changes in the scale of 
existing firms, and (3) changes of ownership (takeovers) of existing firms. The latter category 
is of particular interest for two reasons. First, many academics and policy makers believe that 
Vietnam can benefit from further privatization of existing SOEs. Second, as Wang and Wang 
(2015) emphasize in their study of Chinese firms changing ownership, studies of firms 
changing ownership are arguably better able to identify the effects of MNE ownership than 
studies which compare MNE takeovers to firms that didn’t change ownership. This is because 
focusing on comparisons of different groups of takeover firms can better control for the 
special characteristics of firms changing ownership which are not present in firms with 
constant ownership.  
In order to identify firms changing ownership, one must first construct a panel of all firms 
and then identify firms changing ownership. The six columns on the right side of Table 3 
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reports total employment for the unbalanced panels we have been able to assemble from 
information on manufacturing firms and firms in trade, transport, and storage services 
(referred to as “trade and related services” or simply “trade” below) that were purchased from 
the General Statistics Office (GSO). In principle, these data should yield the same 
employment totals as those reported in published compilations such as General Statistics 
Office (2010, 2013, 2015). However, totals from the panel data are somewhat smaller than the 
totals from corresponding published compilations, which are reproduced in the third and 
fourth columns of Table 3, primarily because the panel data exclude a substantial number of 
firms reporting non-positive values for paid workers, compensation per worker, sales, and 
fixed assets.4 Employment of panel firms include the vast majority (93 percent or more) of 
published totals for manufacturing firms in all years except for 2000 and 2007, when panel 
coverage was markedly lower (82 and 70 percent, respectively). Panel coverage of 
employment in trade and related services was also quite high in 2001-2003 (91 percent or 
more), but substantially lower in other years (58 percent in 2007, 65-67 percent in 2011-2012, 
and 73-79 percent in other years).  
Primarily because most takeovers involve relatively large firms and because data on small 
firms contain a relatively large number of outlier observations, we further restrict the panel 
samples to medium-large firms with 20 or more employees in Tables 4-10. We also exclude 
manufacturing firms in four outlier industries (tobacco, printing and publishing, oil and coal 
products, and recycling) because these industries are highly regulated, very small, and or 
contain firms with very unusual characteristics in Vietnam. We had also wanted to further 
disaggregate manufacturing firms into more homogeneous industry groups similar to the eight 
groups identified by Ramstetter and Phan (2013), for example. However, such disaggregation 
                                                 
4 The existence of substantial numbers of apparently duplicate entries (i.e., numerous entries for the same 
firm identification code), which was especially common in earlier years in the sample, is another possible 
cause, though we do not know how these entries were treated in the published compilations (see Ramstetter 
and Phan 2007, pp. 24-25 for more details on the duplicate problem).  
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is meaningless in this context because samples of takeovers firms are extremely small.  
Comparing Tables 3 and 4, medium-large firms accounted for the vast majority (94 percent 
or more) of panel firm employment in manufacturing and trade MNEs as well as in trade 
SOEs in all years and in manufacturing SOEs through 2005. Shares of medium-large firms 
were also relatively high (87-93 percent) for manufacturing SOEs in 2006-2012 and private 
manufacturing firms in all years, but much lower for private firms in trade and related 
services (60-78 percent). Thus, sample coverage remains relatively high for all ownership 
groups even after eliminating small firms with 19 or fewer workers. 
Table 4 also suggests that SOEs paid the highest real wages on average, followed by MNEs, 
and distantly by private firms, in both manufacturing and trade. This pattern contrasts with 
patterns revealed in previous studies of manufacturing firms, which suggested that MNEs 
generally paid the highest wages. One important reason for this difference is that previous 
studies provided more detailed disaggregation of manufacturing industries. In other words, 
SOEs tend to be concentrated in relatively high-wage industries and this is a major reason 
they appear to pay the highest wages in Table 4. The tendency for MNEs to pay the highest 
wages is even stronger further if the influences of firm characteristics such as size, capital 
intensity, the female share of the workforce, and worker education or occupation are 
accounted for (Nguyen 2015, Nguyen and Ramstetter 2015a, 2015b). 
Correspondingly, similar to Sjöholm and Lipsey’s (2006) analysis of Indonesian plants, we 
initially planned to use a fixed effects estimator to estimate the wage effects of MNE 
takeovers relative to firms that didn’t change ownership, after controlling for such firm-level 
characteristics to the greatest extent possible with the panel data. Likewise, using a PSM 
methodology such as in Wang and Wang’s (2015) analysis of MNE takeovers in Chinese 
manufacturing firms compared to other takeovers is potentially very useful. However, as 
Table 5 reveals, the number of takeovers was extremely low in Vietnam during 2000-2012, 
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only 22 per year in sample manufacturing and 27 per year in trade and related services. 
Moreover, there were very few MNE takeovers, only 1.2 per year in manufacturing and 0.4 
per year in trade. These MNE takeovers affected an average of only 1,418 manufacturing 
workers and 305 trade workers per year. Takeovers by SOEs were similarly rare but they 
were larger, affecting almost as many workers as the much larger number of private takeovers. 
10 firms per year were also recorded as experiencing multiple ownership changes during 
2000-2012. These firms are excluded from the main samples because the ownership of the 
takeover firm cannot be defined unambiguously and because we suspect multiple takeovers 
may in fact reflect data errors in several cases. Nonetheless, it remains that the extremely 
small number of takeovers by MNEs and SOEs renders the use either fixed effects or PSM 
estimators useless because they are only valid asymptotically (i.e., in very large samples).  
Table 6 then shows that private takeovers tended to be substantially larger (employ more 
workers per firm on average) than private firms that did not change ownership in both 
manufacturing and trade. The same pattern was observed for MNE takeovers in trade. On the 
other hand, SOE takeovers in trade and both MNE and SOE takeovers in manufacturing 
tended to be relatively small compared to corresponding MNEs or SOEs that didn’t change 
ownership.  
More importantly, however, the information in Tables 7 and 8 further underscores the 
fragility of the evidence from these small samples. Table 7 report mean levels of employment 
and associated standard deviations, showing that mean employment levels were always 
smaller than associated standard deviations. In other words, the calculations suggest that it is 
impossible to reject the null hypothesis that takeover firms had zero employees on average, in 
all five years surrounding the takeover. Table 8 reports that mean compensation per worker 
was usually larger than associated standard deviations, but here again the variation was so 
large that the null hypothesis of zero wages in all years surrounding the takeover could not be 
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rejected for MNE takeovers in manufacturing or private takeovers in trade. 
Most importantly, calculations of mean growth rates of firm-level employment (Table 9) or 
firm-level wages (Table 10) and associated standard deviations all revealed extremely large 
variation, with standard deviations usually being several times larger than their corresponding 
means. Thus, unlike previous studies of Chinese manufacturing firms or Indonesian 
manufacturing plants, the samples of takeover firms are simply too small and variation too 
large to yield reliable conclusions about how takeovers have affected firm employment and 
wages in Vietnam. Although this result is disappointing to the academic, it also reflects an 
important aspect of Vietnam’s corporate sector. Namely, takeovers have apparently been too 
few and too varied in nature to have imparted systematic effects on employment and wages in 
Vietnamese firms.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has examined how foreign MNEs have grown in Vietnam’s manufacturing and 
trade industries, and shed light on how MNE takeovers of Vietnamese firms have affected 
employment, and wages between 2000 and 2012. As highlighted in the literature review, 
comparisons of employment and wages in MNE takeovers with employment and wages in 
firms with constant ownership, and particularly with other types of takeovers, are of particular 
interest to those seeking to understand the effects of foreign ownership.  
Although the scale of MNE activity has been substantial in Vietnam and grown in recent 
years, there are substantial discrepancies in measures of MNE shares from alternative sources 
and uncertainty over the actual share of MNEs in Vietnamese production or employment. On 
the other hand, the number of MNE takeovers has been very small and they appear to have 
been only a very small source of changes of MNEs shares. Rather changes in MNE shares 
have resulted primarily from the entry and exit MNEs and changes in the scale of existing 
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MNE activity.  
This exercise thus raises far more questions than it answers, three of which are prominent. 
First, why have takeovers been so rare in Vietnam? Is there a strong policy bias that prevents 
takeovers that has remained undetected in the recent literature? Second, alternatively, is there 
a problem with the data, specifically with the firm identifying codes used in the data set used 
in this study and many others like it? In this respect, we know several academics who have 
expressed reservations about the firm identifiers in the data. Assuming that takeovers are 
more common that these data reveal, the evidence in this paper would seem to give further 
credence to those reservations. Third, our method of identifying ownership changes has been 
at an aggregate level; that is we have focused on distinguishing three groups of owners, SOEs, 
MNEs, and private firms. However, the ownership variable available in the data distinguishes 
several types of SOEs and private firms, in addition to wholly foreign MNEs and two types of 
MNE JVs. Would the use of more ownership groups as in Wang and Wang’s (2015) study of 
Chinese firms yield more meaningful results and show ownership changes to be more 
common? We doubt use of more ownership groups would change the number of MNE 
takeovers much but we certainly need to explore the answers to all of these questions in more 
detail before more definitive conclusions can be reached. 
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 Non-Household GDP Enterprise turnover, published
Year SOEs MNEs Private SOEs MNEs MNEs100%
MNE
JVs Private
1995 63 10 27 - - - - - 
1996 62 11 27 - - - - - 
1997 62 14 25 - - - - - 
1998 60 15 24 - - - - - 
1999 58 18 24 - - - - - 
2000 57 20 23 56 20 7 13 24
2001 56 20 23 54 20 8 12 27
2002 56 20 24 54 19 8 11 28
2003 56 21 23 49 20 9 11 31
2004 56 22 22 45 22 11 11 33
2005 55 22 22 44 22 11 11 35
2006 54 24 23 42 22 12 10 36
2007 52 25 23 38 21 12 9 41
2008 51 25 24 35 18 11 7 47
2009 51 25 24 33 18 12 6 49
2010 53 27 20 33 19 13 6 49
2011 52 28 20 33 20 14 5 48
2012 51 28 21 32 22 17 5 47
2013 50 30 20 28 25 20 5 47
2014 49 31 20 - - - - - 
Sources: General Statistics Office (2010, 2013, 2015, various years).
Table 1: Shares of Non-Household GDP and Enterprise Turnover (percent)
Notes: For 2010-2014, non-household GDP also excludes product taxes less 
production subsidies; the SOE share of enterprise turnovers includes central 
government SOEs, local government SOEs and joint stock companies with state 
capital.
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 Non-household employment Enterprise employment, published
Year Total LFS
State
LFS
State
web
Foreign
LFS
Foreign
web
Private
LFS Total SOEs MNEs
MNEs
100%
MNE
JVs Private
2000 - - 4,358 - 359 - 3,537 2,150 408 286 122 979
2001 - - 4,474 - 349 - 3,933 2,229 489 364 125 1,215
2002 - - 4,634 - 426 - 4,658 2,404 691 536 155 1,563
2003 - - 4,919 - 753 - 5,175 2,426 860 688 173 1,889
2004 - - 5,031 - 915 - 5,771 2,434 1,045 865 180 2,291
2005 - - 4,967 - 1,113 - 6,237 2,318 1,221 1,028 192 2,698
2006 - - 4,916 - 1,322 - 6,565 2,267 1,445 1,237 208 2,853
2007 9,058 5,074 4,988 968 1,562 3,017 7,225 2,190 1,686 1,459 227 3,349
2008 - - 5,059 - 1,694 - 7,949 2,198 1,829 1,604 225 3,921
2009 10,283 4,794 5,041 1,398 1,525 4,091 8,719 2,277 1,920 1,691 229 4,522
2010 10,645 4,780 5,107 1,756 1,727 4,110 9,831 2,197 2,156 1,902 254 5,478
2011 11,188 5,251 5,251 1,700 1,700 4,238 10,896 2,165 2,551 2,289 262 6,180
2012 11,544 5,336 5,354 1,700 1,703 4,507 11,085 2,082 2,720 2,476 244 6,283
2013 11,610 5,330 5,330 1,786 1,786 4,494 11,566 2,094 3,051 2,783 268 6,421
2014 12,311 5,474 5,474 2,057 2,057 4,781 - - - - - - 
Sources: General Statistics Office (2010, 2013, 2015, various years a; various years b).
Table 2: Total Employment and Enterprise Employment (thousands)
Notes: For non-household employment LFS series come from Labour Force Survey reports (General Statistics 
Office various years b) and also exclude self-employment while web estimates come from General Statistics Office 
(various years a, 2015 downloads); for enterprises, SOE enterprises include central government SOEs, local 
government SOEs, and joint stock companies with state capital.
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 Total Enterprises, published Enterprises in panel data
Manufacturing Trade, transport, strorage
Year Total SOEs MNEs Total SOEs MNEs
2000 - - 1,571 500 1,295 540 327 387 235 6
2001 - - 1,769 546 1,714 662 425 538 320 7
2002 - - 2,166 627 2,115 723 613 570 299 9
2003 - - 2,515 682 2,450 738 778 620 284 11
2004 - - 2,845 780 2,756 695 952 617 231 12
2005 5,031 5,884 3,048 890 2,854 601 1,058 648 216 16
2006 - - 3,345 996 3,181 473 1,315 741 189 21
2007 5,665 6,271 3,724 1,099 2,625 383 1,098 636 170 18
2008 5,999 6,534 3,927 1,299 3,822 409 1,671 1,031 211 28
2009 6,449 6,577 4,092 1,493 4,021 425 1,751 1,151 231 30
2010 6,646 6,966 4,442 1,803 4,289 319 1,976 1,353 168 34
2011 6,973 7,242 4,872 2,027 4,620 283 2,269 1,361 217 42
2012 7,102 7,812 4,991 1,988 4,658 267 2,379 1,290 152 46
2013 7,267 8,094 5,334 2,061 - - - - - - 
2014 7,415 8,187 - - - - - - - - 
Sources: General Statistics Office (2010, 2013, 2015, various years); authors' calculations 
(for panel data).
Table 3: Total Employment and Enterprise Employment in Manufacturing and Trade 
(thousands)
Notes: SOE enterprises include central government SOEs, local government SOEs, and 
joint stock companies with state capital; for published enterprise data, 2000-2005 
estimated using growth rates of VSIC revsion 3 compilations (which yield 1-2% larger 
totals for manufacturing and trade in 2006-2007, and 19-20% larger totals for transport 
and storage) and VSIC revision 4 compilations for 2006-2013. Panel data include firms 
reporting non-negative paid workers, compensation per worker, turnover, and fixed 
assets.
Manu-
factur-
ing
Trade, 
trans-
port, 
storage
Manu-
factur-
ing
Trade, 
trans-
port, 
storage
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 Employment Mean real compensation per worker
Sample 
manufacturing
Trade, transport, 
storage
Sample 
manufacturing
Trade, transport, 
storage
Year SOEs MNEs Pri-vate SOEs MNEs
Pri-
vate SOEs MNEs
Pri-
vate SOEs MNEs
Pri-
vate
2000 515 326 400 235 6.2 114 6.69 6.60 1.35 4.72 4.38 1.05
2001 629 423 586 319 6.5 156 6.94 6.37 1.36 4.95 4.18 0.92
2002 688 610 725 298 9.3 183 8.26 6.79 1.42 5.62 5.15 0.84
2003 703 775 871 283 11 227 9.95 7.32 1.55 6.61 5.40 0.92
2004 658 947 1,034 231 12 253 10.64 7.39 1.56 5.75 4.88 0.86
2005 564 1,053 1,116 215 16 293 12.24 8.34 1.71 7.65 6.08 1.00
2006 440 1,305 1,290 189 20 339 13.47 8.52 1.84 7.80 6.15 1.04
2007 355 1,091 1,055 170 18 293 14.85 8.89 2.09 10.89 7.37 1.15
2008 376 1,658 1,572 211 27 473 13.08 8.92 1.95 11.74 7.32 1.12
2009 392 1,737 1,648 230 29 533 13.80 9.04 2.17 11.34 8.69 1.24
2010 289 1,962 1,794 168 32 723 14.51 10.89 2.33 20.73 8.17 1.54
2011 249 2,254 1,865 217 40 717 16.08 11.97 2.38 16.80 7.67 1.73
2012 233 2,364 1,806 152 43 688 14.37 15.39 2.85 18.57 9.33 1.67
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 4: Employment and Mean Compensation per Worker in Medium-Large Enterprises in Sample 
Industries (employment in thousands, mean wages in million dong)
Note: Sample manufacturing excludes tobacco, printing and publishing, oil and coal products, and 
recycling. Medium-large firms are those with 20 or more paid workers, and positive compensation 
per worker, turnover, and fixed assets.
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Number of Firms per year Total Workers per year
Sample, industry, type 2000-06 2007-12 2000-12 2000-06 2007-12 2000-12
SAMPLE FIRMS, SINGLE TAKEOVERS
All sample industries 50 50 50 98,597 107,928 102,904
Sample manufacturing 22 23 22 49,476 54,025 51,575
 Private takeovers 21 19 20 16,463 42,678 28,562
 MNE takeovers 0.0 2.7 1.2 470 2,523 1,418
 SOE takeovers 1.4 1.7 1.5 32,542 8,824 21,596
Trade, transport, storage 28 27 27 49,122 53,903 51,328
 Private takeovers 27 24 25 16,146 40,860 27,552
 MNE takeovers 0.0 0.8 0.4 0 660 305
 SOE takeovers 0.7 2.3 1.5 32,976 12,384 23,472
SAMPLE FIRMS, CONSTANT OWNERSHIP
All sample industries 19,609 41,890 29,893 3,344,664 5,355,397 4,272,695
Sample manufacturing 9,261 17,649 13,132 2,187,367 3,438,039 2,764,601
 Private 6,447 13,490 9,698 863,245 1,577,763 1,193,022
 MNEs 1,771 3,614 2,622 784,100 1,612,108 1,166,258
 SOEs 1,043 545 813 540,022 248,168 405,320
Trade, transport, storage 10,349 24,242 16,761 1,157,297 1,917,357 1,508,094
 Private 8,554 22,908 15,179 562,661 1,522,330 1,005,585
 MNEs 137 388 253 17,012 41,336 28,238
 SOEs 1,658 945 1,329 577,624 353,692 474,270
EXCLUDED FIRMS IN SAMPLE INDUSTRIES
Multiple ownership changes 9 12 10 17,832 16,978 17,438
Small size 33,491 122,466 74,556 266,834 870,093 545,261
Implausible data 6,616 15,922 10,911 78,992 144,192 109,085
Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Sample manufacturing excludes tobacco, printing and publishing, oil and coal products, 
and recycling. Medium-large firms are those with 20 or more paid workers, and positive 
compensation per worker, turnover, and fixed assets.
Table 5: Number of medium-large firms and total workers by industry and takeover status or 
owner
23
Mean workers per firm
Mean compensation 
per worker
Sample, industry, type 2000-06 2007-12 2000-12 2000-06 2007-12 2000-12
SAMPLE FIRMS, SINGLE TAKEOVERS
All sample firms 420.59 412.20 416.49 16.33 24.20 20.18
Sample manufacturing 477.04 454.63 465.94 14.03 22.11 18.03
 Private takeovers 385.43 504.07 460.11 13.64 21.16 18.37
 MNE takeovers 365.67 225.97 242.51 25.84 30.46 29.91
 SOE takeovers 544.97 383.66 504.93 14.06 21.56 15.92
Trade, transport, storage 375.79 376.95 376.35 18.15 25.95 21.92
 Private takeovers 299.79 378.33 349.44 17.41 25.16 22.31
 MNE takeovers - 232.88 232.88 - 45.30 45.30
 SOE takeovers 429.05 384.98 417.42 18.67 26.86 20.83
SAMPLE FIRMS, CONSTANT OWNERSHIP
All sample firms 180.20 134.49 150.59 12.58 19.10 16.80
Sample manufacturing 247.20 209.29 223.92 11.84 17.08 15.06
 Private 137.71 120.96 126.98 9.36 14.68 12.77
 MNEs 455.91 543.19 507.99 19.86 26.29 23.70
 SOEs 627.83 597.28 618.88 13.82 26.62 17.57
Trade, transport, storage 119.15 81.96 94.10 13.25 20.51 18.15
 Private 68.86 68.18 68.38 12.16 19.53 17.33
 MNEs 126.55 135.01 132.15 44.85 61.96 56.17
 SOEs 410.54 466.41 428.19 16.54 32.81 21.68
EXCLUDED FIRMS IN SAMPLE INDUSTRIES
Multiple ownership changes 308.21 232.04 268.59 18.75 25.21 22.11
Small size 7.97 7.10 7.31 10.96 17.94 16.26
Implausible data 12.61 9.06 10.18 10.63 17.18 15.21
Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Sample manufacturing excludes tobacco, printing and publishing, oil and coal 
products, and recycling. Medium-large firms are those with 20 or more paid workers, and 
positive compensation per worker, turnover, and fixed assets.
Table 6: Mean workers per firm and compensation per worker in medium-large firms by 
industry and takeover status or owner
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Sample, industry, type t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
MEAN WORKERS PER FIRM
All sample firms 462.58 451.12 409.25 387.27 373.53
Sample manufacturing 499.33 501.56 463.04 445.72 421.30
 Private takeovers 271.00 234.58 497.04 474.29 445.53
 MNE takeovers 305.54 504.21 127.50 160.06 164.65
 SOE takeovers 528.83 527.25 296.20 311.40 334.20
Trade, transport, storage 432.63 410.93 365.01 339.80 334.75
 Private takeovers 86.20 113.29 376.62 350.72 343.90
 MNE takeovers 38.00 - 250.80 250.60 235.67
 SOE takeovers 444.15 429.42 192.74 171.84 213.55
STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF WORKERS PER FIRM
All sample firms 703.25 719.00 658.81 581.11 578.73
Sample manufacturing 698.94 740.32 697.89 650.57 621.09
 Private takeovers 333.93 305.04 730.43 680.59 652.17
 MNE takeovers 319.17 673.05 151.56 199.61 188.69
 SOE takeovers 731.10 769.61 375.95 373.75 351.88
Trade, transport, storage 706.33 699.99 622.35 513.95 539.69
 Private takeovers 99.20 136.26 638.34 526.82 554.72
 MNE takeovers 1 firm - 404.22 407.26 394.54
 SOE takeovers 714.75 716.62 270.28 184.58 229.55
Source: Authors' compilations.
Table 7: Mean workers per firm in medium-large takevoer firms by industry and 
takeover status or owner by year (t=takeover year)
Note: Sample manufacturing excludes tobacco, printing and publishing, oil and coal 
products, and recycling. Medium-large firms are those with 20 or more paid workers, 
and positive compensation per worker, turnover, and fixed assets.
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Sample, industry, type t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
MEAN COMPENSATION PER WORKER
All sample firms 17.23 19.18 20.25 21.92 22.24
Sample manufacturing 15.24 16.63 17.79 19.58 20.85
 Private takeovers 13.58 17.39 16.91 18.59 20.12
 MNE takeovers 22.54 21.24 31.66 36.00 35.31
 SOE takeovers 15.00 16.29 17.94 18.97 17.77
Trade, transport, storage 18.85 21.21 22.27 23.83 23.36
 Private takeovers 25.99 22.73 21.81 22.17 22.82
 MNE takeovers 23.15 - 39.56 55.09 45.61
 SOE takeovers 18.62 21.11 25.67 44.76 25.72
STANDARD DEVIATION OF MEAN COMPENSATION PER WORKER
All sample firms 14.63 17.69 17.87 20.60 16.70
Sample manufacturing 10.97 11.58 13.66 15.33 17.24
 Private takeovers 8.09 10.84 11.02 13.67 15.50
 MNE takeovers 17.64 14.56 35.41 31.33 35.28
 SOE takeovers 10.65 11.45 7.93 8.42 8.63
Trade, transport, storage 16.88 21.15 20.51 23.89 16.19
 Private takeovers 17.53 14.54 20.83 16.33 14.99
 MNE takeovers 1 firm - 19.35 54.02 50.85
 SOE takeovers 16.87 21.50 11.54 70.24 12.68
Source: Authors' compilations.
Table 8: Mean compensation per worker in medium-large takeover firms by industry 
and takeover status or owner (t=takeover year)
Note: Sample manufacturing excludes tobacco, printing and publishing, oil and coal 
products, and recycling. Medium-large firms are those with 20 or more paid workers, 
and positive compensation per worker, turnover, and fixed assets.
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Sample, industry, type t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
MEAN GROWTH RATES OF WORKERS
All sample firms 25.43 47.98 34.46 25.26 8.39
Sample manufacturing 34.34 66.94 53.17 41.61 2.86
 Private takeovers -2.76 756.35 1.37 0.71 -0.27
 MNE takeovers 202.42 134.08 486.54 730.24 33.08
 SOE takeovers 27.84 -3.57 369.46 10.15 16.65
Trade, transport, storage 18.48 32.84 19.07 11.98 12.88
 Private takeovers 13.29 389.49 -4.71 11.35 6.24
 MNE takeovers - - 284.94 -3.65 308.56
 SOE takeovers 18.58 11.74 363.30 27.16 33.73
STANDARD DEVIATIONS MEAN GROWTH RATES OF WORKERS
All sample firms 197.43 369.56 326.66 460.69 87.13
Sample manufacturing 277.38 504.40 334.37 680.16 42.99
 Private takeovers 8.33 1600.61 79.28 37.26 39.22
 MNE takeovers 484.57 237.48 673.23 2890.07 66.64
 SOE takeovers 269.59 24.60 985.17 36.76 52.89
Trade, transport, storage 96.81 205.82 319.84 95.82 110.58
 Private takeovers 23.03 681.48 53.77 97.75 58.64
 MNE takeovers - - 539.86 8.45 682.73
 SOE takeovers 97.73 103.43 1,318.70 70.77 131.92
Source: Authors' compilations.
Table 9: Mean growth rates of workers in medium-large takevoer firms by industry 
and takeover status or owner by year (t=takeover year)
Note: Sample manufacturing excludes tobacco, printing and publishing, oil and coal 
products, and recycling. Medium-large firms are those with 20 or more paid workers, 
and positive compensation per worker, turnover, and fixed assets.
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Sample, industry, type t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
MEAN GROWTH RATES OF COMPENSATION PER WORKER
All sample firms 24.80 42.41 26.55 36.61 22.75
Sample manufacturing 26.66 32.14 27.29 42.63 28.95
 Private takeovers 27.83 45.70 23.11 44.66 32.30
 MNE takeovers 24.63 46.94 102.89 55.28 4.89
 SOE takeovers 26.70 29.99 20.26 6.73 7.16
Trade, transport, storage 23.35 50.61 25.95 31.71 17.73
 Private takeovers 55.43 143.56 24.75 27.62 18.51
 MNE takeovers - - 43.80 32.66 17.68
 SOE takeovers 22.71 45.11 42.10 103.06 4.89
STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF COMPENSATION PER WORKER GROWTH
All sample firms 118.60 168.06 109.99 192.06 121.87
Sample manufacturing 135.02 119.12 116.23 250.04 163.78
 Private takeovers 34.19 106.51 112.70 263.94 173.46
 MNE takeovers 133.85 192.75 181.64 163.40 45.67
 SOE takeovers 138.87 115.44 72.61 27.66 78.59
Trade, transport, storage 104.21 198.47 104.74 126.98 71.61
 Private takeovers 94.53 297.97 105.88 99.20 70.88
 MNE takeovers - - 80.65 72.47 116.33
 SOE takeovers 104.44 190.21 91.57 361.26 71.13
Source: Authors' compilations.
Table 10: Mean growth rates compensation per worker in medium-large takevoer 
firms by industry and takeover status or owner by year (t=takeover year)
Note: Sample manufacturing excludes tobacco, printing and publishing, oil and coal 
products, and recycling. Medium-large firms are those with 20 or more paid workers, 
and positive compensation per worker, turnover, and fixed assets.
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